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Abstract
Putnam (1995)’s seminal work was one of the first to describe the decline of social capital in the
US after the 1960s, a period that saw a large increase in the flow of immigrants into the US.
Using the Volunteer Supplement of the September Sample of the Current Population Survey (CPS)
between 2004 and 2011, we examine the relationship between immigration and social capital in the
US, measured by membership of organizations, volunteering and hours volunteered. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address this question. Once we correct for immigrants’
self-selection to different destinations using a supply-push instrumental variable, we find that a one
standard deviation increase in the number of immigrants decreases volunteering by 0.08 to 0.12
standard deviations, or that the 8.7 million legal immigrants who entered the US between 2005
and 2011 reduced the probability Americans volunteered between 27.8% and 35.7%. From our
robustness checks we argue that the reduction in volunteering by natives is driven by the the fact
that new immigrants have a lower social capital, reducing the benefits of volunteering. Our results
have important implications for public policy. We show that migrants’ social capital has an impact
on receiving communities. Therefore immigrants’ social capital (such as having relatives living at
the receiving community) should be taken into consideration. Future research should focus on what
is the optimal weight to give to the presence of family members versus, for instance, educational
level of the immigrants.
Keywords: Migration; Social Capital; Volunteer; Race
JEL Classification Numbers: J61, J79, Z13.
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1 Introduction
In his seminal work Putnam (1995) describes the decline of social capital in the US, where mem-
bership of organizations like the PTA and Red Cross dropped by 25% between the 1960s and the
1990s. This was also a period that saw a large amount of immigration; the share of foreign-born
rose from 5.4% in 1960 to 9.3% in 1996 (Borjas et al. (1997)). Is there a causal relationship between
these two trends? How does immigration contribute to the reduction in social capital in the US?
Putnam (1995) proposes several hypotheses for the decline of social capital and looks at correlations
in the data but fails to show causality, as pointed out by Durlauf (2002b) and Durlauf (2002a).
Several papers have since re-examined these hypotheses. For instance, Goldin & Katz (1999) show
that the increase in education was correlated with the increase in social capital between 1910 and
1940, while DiPasquale & Glaeser (1999) demonstrate how expected mobility reduces social capital,
as individuals who own their homes are more likely to participate in local activities. Costa & Kahn
(2001) argue that the drop in social capital is driven, not only by the increase in inequality and the
heterogeneity of communities, but also by the increase in women’s labor force participation. Norris
& Inglehart (2005) point out that part of the reduction in women’s social capital is driven by the
fact that women participate in different social activities from men, and Alesina & LaFerrara (2000)
find that social participation is lower in neighborhoods where inequality is higher and there is larger
racial and ethnic fragmentation. Finally, Olken (2009) finds that the introduction of television
in Indonesia led to a reduction in individuals’ participation in social activities. These results are
reconciled in an individual utility maximization model developed by Glaeser et al. (2002), where
individual social capital investment increases with the opportunity cost of time, among occupations
with higher returns to social skills, and in communities where aggregate social capital is higher,
while it decreases with age and relocation to a different community. More recent papers, such as
Bellows & Miguel (2009), have proposed other reasons for the accumulation of social capital. In
particular, Bellows & Miguel (2009) argue that individuals affected by the 1991-2002 armed conflict
in Sierra Leone increased their investment in social capital. When it comes to the relationship
between immigration and social capital, previous researchers have looked at the incentives that lead
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immigrants to volunteer (Kawashima-Ginsberg & Kirby (2009)) and the benefits of volunteering
for immigrants (Handy & Greenspan (2009)). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
to study the impact of immigration on social capital (in particular, volunteering) in the receiving
communities.
We use the September sample of the Current Population Survey (CPS) between 2004 and 2011,
providing information on membership of social organizations, volunteering and volunteer hours, to
estimate how an increase in the number of immigrants reported in the CPS affects social capital
investment. Our reduced form results at the state, metropolitan and individual levels demonstrate
that immigration has a negative influence on all measures of social capital1. Furthermore, we argue
that this relationship is causal. One of the major issues is the possibility of reverse causality, namely
that more individuals are likely to migrate to regions where there was an increase in social capital, in
response to changes in their social networks (similar to Munshi (2003)). We correct for this by using
a supply push instrumental variable commonly used in immigration literature. The supply push
instrumental variable corrects for immigrants’ response to changes in conditions at the destination.
It does this by keeping constant the location pattern of immigrants, in a similar fashion to Card
(2001), Peri (2011) and Wozniak & Murray (2012). Our instrumental variable estimates show that
areas which see an increase in the number of immigrants by one million see a reduction in the
probability of volunteering by 0.32% to 0.41%.
The existing theory of social capital allows for several mechanisms that could be behind this corre-
lation. For example, immigrants could have a lower propensity to volunteer (Kawashima-Ginsberg
& Kirby (2009)) or it could be that the lower aggregate social capital in the community leads to a
lower investment in social capital (Glaeser et al. (2002)). The impact could also be indirect, through
changes in labor markets, such as lower wages (Glaeser et al. (2002)). While this paper is not able
to identify the exact mechanism behind the relationship between immigration and social capital,
our robustness checks seem to indicate that the reduction in individual investment in social capital
can be attributed to the reduction in aggregate social capital in the communities where immigrants
settle, consistent with the model by Glaeser et al. (2002).
1Although this is not always statistically significant.
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Given the importance of social capital to the acquisition of skills and human capital (Loury (1977)),
economic growth (Knack & Keefer (1997)), government efficiency and corruption (LaPorta et al.
(1997)) and financial development (Guiso et al. (2000)), our results provide valuable insights for
public policy. They show that immigration has a negative impact on social capital and therefore
should be taken into consideration in immigration laws. In particular, future research should focus
on the trade-off between the benefits from the immigration of high skilled workers and the costs
from the reduction in social capital.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data we use, in Section 3 we describe
our empirical strategy, and in Section 4 we conclude.
2 Social Capital and Immigration in the US between 2004 and
2011
Social capital is an elaborate concept and its definition is quite complicated (see Guiso et al. (2011)
for a discussion). Previous work has focused on two proxies for social capital. Some studies use
trust, as measured by questions such as ”Would you say that most people can be trusted?” for
a proxy for social capital. as pointed out by Glaeser et al. (2002) and Glaeser et al. (2000) the
conclusions from these studies are that people who report being more trusting do not show more
trust in standard trust games, putting into question the validity of trust as a proxy for social
capital. A second proxy, used by Putnam (2000) for instance, is organization membership. However,
studies use organizational membership to represent the stock of social capital, while others use it
as a proxy for the flow of social capital. We build on this last literature by using organization
membership measures from the CPS, as a proxy for the stock of social capital. For a proxy of social
capital we use volunteering measures reported in the CPS (a dummy for whether an individual
volunteered in at least one organization and total number of hours individuals volunteered) as a
proxy for the flow of social capital. As pointed out by Putnam (2000) and Beyerlein & Hipp (2006),
active participation in communities is more important to the construction of social capital than
group membership. In particular, Bekkers (2005) argues that volunteering is an important form of
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community participation. Our results for these two proxies of social capital are consistent.
According to the CPS September Volunteer Supplement, the percentage of people between the ages
of 16 and 65 who reported volunteering for organizations dropped from 3.4% in 2005 to 3% in
20112 while, for those who did report volunteering, the total number of hours volunteered dropped
from 3.8 hours per week in 2005 to 0.96 hours per week in 2011 (averages for this time period
are reported in Table 1). Compared with other surveys, the CPS reports much lower values. For
instance, according to Costa & Kahn (2001), between 1974 and 1998 the fraction of people between
the ages of 16 and 54 who had volunteered in the previous year stood at 53% according to the DDB
Needham Life Style Survey and the Gallup Giving and Volunteering in the United States and at
6% in the NPD Group Time Study Data. One of the reasons for the differences in volunteering
figures across the surveys is due to respondents’ self-selection. Abraham et al. (2008) find that
CPS respondents who take part in the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) are much more likely
to report volunteering than the individuals in the general CPS September sample.
While only 49.4% of the respondents in our sample are women, they account for 63.3% of those
who report volunteering for organizations, consistent with Norris & Inglehart (2005). Volunteers
in our sample are also more likely to be married (50.7% of the individuals in our overall sample
are married, while 63.7% of our volunteers are married, as reported in Table 1 and Table 2) and
to have children (30.2% of individuals in our sample have children, while 61.8% of volunteers have
children).
We find that volunteers have a similar racial distribution to that of the overall population (68.42% of
the population is white, while 73.57% of the volunteers are white, while the corresponding figures are
12.58% and 9.78% respectively for Hispanics, 10.70% and 9.5% respectively for African Americans,
and 4.67% and 3.1% respectively for Asians as you see in Table1 and Table 2). Finally, individuals
with higher levels of education are more likely to volunteer (while only 30.6% of individuals in our
sample have a bachelor’s degree, 44.29% of volunteers have one). Note that the number of people
who report their income is very low (6.85% of the people in our sample). This is a known problem
2The CPS started collecting data for the Volunteer Supplement in 2003 but, due to changes in the questions about
race and ethnicity in 2005, the data for 2004 and 2003 have been dropped from our sample.
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with the CPS September sample.
The CPS has been used extensively in the migration literature. Immigrants are defined as foreign-
born individuals in the survey, in a manner similar to Borjas et al. (1997) and Ottaviano & Peri
(2008). In our sample of people between the ages of 16 and 65, the fraction who were foreign-born
rose from 15.9% in 2005 to 17.4% in 2011 (average over our sample period is 15.7% as reported
in Table 1). We also find that immigrants in the CPS have a lower propensity to be members
of an organization (as you can see in Table ??) yet, unlike in the general population, there has
been a small increase over time, from 2% in 2005 to 2.6% in 2011. The major difference between
migrants and the overall population lies in their racial composition, with 21.1% of immigrants
being white, 45.3% Hispanic, 8.04% are of Arican origin and 22.5% of Asian origin (Table ??).
Immigrants are similar to our overall sample in terms of the remaining characteristics (education,
age, etc). The correlation between the fraction of white people volunteering in organizations and
the fraction of white foreign-born people over our sample period is presented in figure 1. This shows
a negative relationship between immigration and membership of organizations across states (and in
Washington DC) between 2005 and 2011. In our analysis in Section 3 is designed to show that this
relationship is causal.
We conduct our analysis at three levels: Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), state and individual.
Our state sample contains 50 states and Washington DC; the MSA sample contains 135 cities. We
use information about the county of residence drawn from the CPS in order to identify the MSA.
The individual-level sample is used to calculate income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient,
and racial fractionalization, using the same measure as Costa & Kahn (2001), fraci = 1−
∑
k s
2
ki,
where k is the race category (White, Hispanic, African American, Asian and Other) and sik is the
share of race k in either state or metropolitan area i. While the values of the Gini coefficient in our
sample are consistent with those reported in Costa & Kahn (2001), the racial fractionalization is
twice as large in our sample, possibly because we treat White and Hispanic as two different racial
groups.
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3 Empirical Strategy
In this paper we focus on two reduced-form relationships between immigrants and social capital.
The first reduced form describes the relationship between the stock of social capital and the stock
of immigrants (foreign-born people) as follows:
SCit = α+ β1Immigit + β2Xit + γi + δt + εit (1)
where SCit is the stock of social capital, proxied by organization membership recorded in the CPS
September sample, in a particular area i in a particular year t. Immigit is the stock of immigrants
in the same area and year, Xit is a set of controls for area characteristics (income inequality and
racial fragmentation for the state and MSA-level regressions) and individual characteristics (for
the individual-level regressions), γi are area fixed effects (either state or MSA, depending on the
specification) and δt are year dummy variables. In essence, we are comparing states (or MSAs or
individuals living in states) receiving more immigrants (i.e. foreign-born individuals) in the last
year (treated group) with those that received fewer immigrants, before and after treatment (control
group). Since all areas receive immigrants, our estimates of β1 can be interpreted as local average
treatment effects (LATE).
The second reduced-form relationship is between the flow of social capital and the flow of immigrants
(change in the number of foreign-born individuals):
∆SCit = α+ β1∆Immigit + β2Xit + γi + δt + it (2)
where ∆SCit is the flow of social capital (proxied by volunteering and hours volunteered) in area i
in year t and ∆Immigit is the change in the number of foreign-born individuals in area i in year t.
Furthermore, Xit, γi and δt are defined as in equation 1. In this random growth model, we are trying
to determine whether the areas where immigration increases the fastest (or the slowest) are also the
areas where investment in social capital decreases (or increases) the most. We are comparing the
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growth of social capital in states (or MSAs) subject to different (and assumed random) increases
in the number of immigrants (treatment), in different time periods. Therefore, as before, we can
interpret our estimates of β1 as LATE.
We address potential bias in our estimates of β1 by constructing a supply push instrument in Section
??. Our results are consistent with the presence of reverse causality (i.e. individuals move to areas
where social capital is higher).
There are potentially several mechanisms through which immigration may be correlated with social
capital. There are four mechanisms which are often cited in the literature. Costa & Kahn (2001)
point out that immigration could increase racial (and ethnic) fractionalization and/or income in-
equality, resulting in lower social capital (and also lower investment in social capital). It is also
possible that immigrants have a lower propensity to invest in social capital (everything else being
equal), as argued by Kawashima-Ginsberg & Kirby (2009), lowering the average social capital in
the communities they live in. This could lead to a spillover effect, where the lower social capital in
a community leads all individuals living in the community (foreign-born or otherwise) to lower their
investment in social capital, according to the model by Glaeser et al. (2002). Glaeser et al. (2002)
findings however do not support this hypothesis. We can think of our reduced form regressions as
capturing the sum of the impact of immigration on social capital through all these mechanisms, in
a manner similar to Borjas et al. (2010) and Bianchi et al. (2012).
Though our data do not allow us to identify the exact mechanism through which immigration
affects social capital, we perform robustness checks that allow us to narrow down the possibilities.
Specifically, in Section 3.1, migration flows and social capital investment are split by race, allowing
us to test whether migration flows are affecting social capital through income. We argue that
the mechanism through which migration affects social capital is not income. We also argue that
racial fractionalization and income inequality are not driving our results, as our estimates of β1
remain unchanged with the inclusion of controls for racial fractionalization and income inequality.
Furthermore, in Section 3.3 we show that immigrants have a lower social capital (and propensity
to invest in social capital) but this also leaves our estimates of β1. By exclusion we argue that the
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reduction in social capital is being driven by lower social capital for all individuals in the community,
consistent with the model proposed by Glaeser et al. (2002) yet contradicting his empirical findings.
3.1 Area Approach
Previous authors have pointed out the importance of measuring social capital at the aggregate
level in order to capture all externalities associated with the concept of social capital itself (see for
instance Norris & Inglehart (2005) and Guiso et al. (2011)). To take externalities into consideration
we begin by looking at the correlation between social capital and immigration at the metropolitan
(MSA) level.
We use a reduced-form relationship between the total number of foreign-born individuals in the
metropolitan area and the total number of people who are members of an organization, as specified
in equation 1, to test whether immigration affects the stock of social capital. Our results are
reported in Table 4. Since we include MSA fixed effects and year dummies, our estimates in column
(1) show a negative (yet not statistically significant) correlation between changes in the number
of foreign-born individuals and changes in the stock of social capital, across MSAs. In columns
(3) and (5) of Table 4, we shift our attention to the flow of social capital, measured by the total
number of volunteers (column (3)) and the total hours volunteered (column (5)). While the results
for number of volunteers are positive (though again not statistically significant), the results for
hours volunteered are negative (a one standard deviation (s.d.) increase in the total number of
foreign-born individuals in an area leads to a 0.15 s.d. decrease in the number of hours volunteered
by individuals in that area) and statistically significant at the 10% level.
In columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 4, we split our sample by race (White, Hispanic, African
American, Asian and Other). This allow us to divide immigrants into immigrants which are the
same race as current residents in the state (or MSA) or whether they are of a different race. This
allows us to check whether migration affects social capital through income or another mechanism.
If migration is affecting social capital through income then immigrants’ race should not matter, and
the estimates for the coefficients of total number of foreign born people and number of own race
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foreign born people should be the same. This is because, as found by Borjas et al. (2010) workers of
different races are perfect substitutes, so that what matters for income is the total number of foreign
born, not their race. If, on the other hand, immigration is affecting social capital through a different
mechanism (such as the reduction in the average social capital in the community) then the coefficient
for number of own race foreign born people should be greater in magnitude than the coefficient for
total number of foreign born people. This is because race is important in determining an individual’s
social network and therefore their social capital (see for instance Loury (1977) and Luttmer (2001)).
Table 4, shows that an increase in the number of own race foreign born is associated with an
increase in all our measures of social capital (though our results are only statistically significant for
membership of organizations and probability of volunteering). Furtermore, the coefficient for the
number of own race foreign born people is not statistically different from coefficient for the total
number of foreign born people.
These results could be biased towards zero if natives or previous migrants with low levels of social
capital respond to the inflow of new immigrants by moving to another MSA within their current
state of residence, as pointed out by Borjas (2003). In order to correct for this, we aggregate all our
variables at the state level (plus Washington DC), as proposed by Borjas (2003), to capture these
internal migrants. We conduct the same regressions as in Table 4 and present our results in Table
5. Most of our coefficients in Table 5, at the state level, are larger in absolute value, than those in
Table 4, at the MSA level. This is consistent with the possibility that natives or previous migrants
with low levels of social capital are displaced by new immigrants. As before, our results are not
statistically significant.
3.2 Instrumental Variable
Another potential source of bias comes from reverse causality. As pointed out by Munshi (2003),
social networks are important in the decision to migrate. In particular, previous immigrants can
help more recent immigrants to find jobs in the US. Therefore, states where the social capital of
immigrants increases, could see an increase in the inflow of immigrants. In other words, the social
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capital of previous immigrants acts as another pull factor. The increased inflow of immigrants would
then reduce social capital in these states, biasing our estimates towards zero.
To address this issue, an instrument is needed to isolate supply-push from demand-pull factors.
We follow Card (2001), Peri (2011) and Wozniak & Murray (2012) in constructing our supply-push
instrumental variable, which consists of breaking the migration flow (not the stock or total number
of immigrants), according to the following equation:
SPIVst = γs∆Migt (3)
where γs corresponds to the historical pattern of immigration settlement to a particular state s
and ∆Migt consists of the total number of immigrants who moved into the US in a particular year
t. The 2000 Population Census from Ruggles et al. (2010) is used to construct γs, the share of
foreign-born individuals in each state out of the total number of foreign-born individuals living in
the US. The advantage of using the historical patterns of settlement for immigrants is that the
immigrant inflow into a state s in year t is not responding to current changes in the social capital
of previous immigrants in a particular state for a particular year3. Since we control for changes
in the migration patterns to different states, we are eliminating any bias deriving from migrants
picking their destination in response to changes in the social capital of individuals in a particular
state. Note that the supply-push instrumental variable is a flow variable, which can only be used
with equation 2. Therefore, we focus our analysis here on volunteering and hours volunteered.
Our first-stage results at the state level are reported in Table 64. The supply-push instrumental
variable is strongly correlated with the number of immigrants coming in to the state. In particular,
in column (1) of Table 6, a one standard deviation increase in the supply-push instrumental variable
leads to a 0.57 standard deviation growth in the number of foreign-born individuals moving in to
the state. Based on equation 3, we can redefine our instrument by splitting migration flows by
race. Therefore, we obtain a supply-push instrumental variable for own race and a supply-push
3It is possible that migration flows are still responding to long-term trends in the social capital of immigrants in
the US. However, state and year dummies control for long-term trends in social capital across states and years.
4The MSA results are not reported but they are consistent with our state-level instrumental variable results
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instrumental variable for all other races5 as instruments for changes in the total number of own-
race foreign-born individuals and changes in the total number of foreign-born individuals of other
races. As can be seen from column (3) of Table 6, a one standard deviation increase in the supply-
push instrumental variable for own race leads to a 0.50 standard deviation increase in the number of
immigrants moving into the state, while the same increase in the supply-push instrumental variable
for other races leads to only a 0.07 standard deviation increase in the number of immigrants (both
statistically significant). Similarly, in column (2) of Table 6, a one standard deviation increase in
the supply-push instrumental variable for all other races leads to a (statistically significant) 0.52
standard deviation increase in the number of immigrants of all other races moving into the state,
while a change in the supply-push instrumental variable for own race has a much smaller and
statistically insignificant influence on the number of immigrants of other races moving in to the
state. These results support the argument that our instruments are able to capture migration flows
by race, and can be used to determine the causal impact of migration on social capital, by race.
As we expected, once we control for the self-selection of immigrants into particular destinations, a
one standard deviation increase in the number of immigrants leads to a 0.12 standard deviations
decrease in the total number of volunteers in the state (Table 7, column (1)), though it does not have
a statistically significant impact on the total number of hours volunteered (Table 7, column (3)).
More importantly, when the analysis is done by race we can see that this result is driven mainly
by changes in the number of own-race immigrants, instead of the total number of immigrants. In
particular, an increase in the number of own-race immigrants leads to a 0.08 standard deviations
decrease in the total number of volunteers in the state (Table 7, column(2)), and our results for
total number of hours volunteered are consistent but statistically insignificant (column (4) in Table
7). This suggests that immigration has to a negative impact in the extensive margin (total number
of people who volunteer) is compensated by changes at the intensive margin (number of hours
volunteered).
5In Table 6, this variable is labeled as the supply-push instrumental variable in columns (2) and (3).
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3.3 Individual-level results
As pointed out by Glaeser et al. (2002), aggregate behavior may not reflect individual behavior,
which can lead to omitted variable bias. Therefore we repeat our analysis at the individual level
by looking at the probability of being member of an organization, the probability of volunteering6
and the hours volunteered by individuals, and their correlations with the inflows of immigrants to
a particular state.
Our reduced-form results for the relationship between social organization membership and immigra-
tion are presented in Table 8. Although there does not seem to be any correlation between the total
number of foreign-born people in the state and the likelihood of being a member of an organization
(column (1)), when we separate migration flows by race in order to separate the impact of migration
on wages and social capital (as explained earlier), we find that a one standard deviation increase in
the number of foreign-born individuals in the state leads to a 0.76 percentage points increase in the
probability of being a member of an organization.
Next, following Glaeser et al. (2002), we include controls for individual characteristics (age, educa-
tion, gender, migration status, full-time employment, hourly income, marital status and number of
children), household characteristics (household income and household size) and state characteristics
(Gini coefficient for income inequality and racial fractionalization) in columns (3) to (5). Most
of our results are consistent with previous findings. In particular, we find an inverted u-shaped
relationship between being a member of an organization and age. Furthermore, highly educated
people, women and married individuals are more likely to be members of organizations. Furtermorer
income has a positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level) effect on social organization
membership consistent with Glaeser et al. (2002). The negative sign on our dummy variable for
being born in a foreign country is consistent with previous work (see Kawashima-Ginsberg & Kirby
(2009)), yet it is not clear whether this is because immigrants have a lower propensity to invest in
social capital or whether immigrants respond to a decrease in average social capital in the states in
6Since it is not possible to obtain unconditional marginal probabilities is we estimate a probit model with fixed
effects and the calculations for intrumental variable logit with fixed effects are cumberson we use the linear probability
model in this section.
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which they settle 7. However, it does allow us to estimate to seperate this effect for American born
people. Our results in column (4) are the same as in column (2) (a one standard deviation increase
in the number of own-race immigrants leads to a 0.76 percentage point decrease in the probability
of individuals being members of an organization for which they volunteer). Furthermore, when we
include controls for state characteristics (Gini coefficient and racial fractionalization) in column (5),
we obtain the same results.
Our estimates for investment in social capital, measured by the probability of volunteering and
hours volunteered by individuals, are shown in Table 9 and Table 10 respectively. The results are
consistent with those in Table 8, showing that an increase in the number of own-race immigrants
has a negative impact on both forms of social capital investment. In column (1) of both Table 9
and Table 10, total migration does not seem to affect either the probability of volunteering or the
number of hours volunteered. However, once we break down our migration flows by race in columns
(2), (4) and (5), a one standard deviation increase in the number of own-race immigrants leads to a
0.04 percentage points (not statistically significant) drop in the probability of volunteering (Table
9) and a statistically significant 0.004 standard deviation drop in the number of hours volunteered
(Table 10). Our results remain the same when we include controls for individual characteristics in
column (4) and state characteristics in column (5).
Finally, we correct for reverse causality, as in Section 3.2. Our first-stage results are reported in Table
11 and Table 12. For both endogenous variables, total immigration and own-race immigration flows,
the supply-push instrumental variable defined in equation 3 is positively related and statistically
significant. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the supply-push instrumental variable
for the total number of immigrants (excluding own-race number of immigrants in columns (2)
through (4)) increases the total number of immigrants by 0.56 to 0.64 standard deviations (Table
11) and the number of own-race immigrants by 0.32 standard deviations (Table 12), while a one
standard deviation increase in the supply-push instrumental variable for own race increases the
total number of foreign-born individuals arriving each year (excluding the number of immigrants of
one’s own race) by 0.006 standard deviations (column (2) through (4) in Table 11) and the number
7This is commonly known in the literature as the reflection problem.
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of own-race immigrants by 0.52 standard deviations (Table 12).
Our second-stage results for our instrumental variables regarding the likelihood of volunteering are
reported in Table 13, and are consistent with our earlier findings. Specifically, a one standard devia-
tion in the number of total immigrants into the state leads to a 0.16 percentage points (significant at
the 10% level) reduction in the probability of volunteering (column (1)). In addition, after disaggre-
gating our results by race, we find that only the change in the number of own-race immigrants leads
to a decrease in the probability of volunteering, in particular a 0.01 standard deviation increase in
the number of own-race immigrants leads to statistically significant (at the 10% level) 9 percentage
points to 12 percentage points decrease in the probability of volunteering (columns (2) to (4)).
Our results for hours volunteered reported in Table 14 are similar, though our coefficients are not
statistically significant. Specifically, a one standard deviation in the number of total immigrants into
the state leads to a 0.01 standard deviations reduction in the number of hours volunteered (column
(1)), while a one standard deviation increase in the number of own-race immigrants reduces the
number of hours volunteered by between 0.06 and 0.07 standard deviations (columns (2) to (4)).
4 Conclusion
We examined the relationship between immigration and three forms of social capital in the US. We
have consistently found at the aggregate and individual level that immigration leads to a reduction in
the stock of social capital (proxied by organization membership) and flow of social capital (proxied by
volunteering). In particular, each one million immigrants which enter the US reduced the likelihood
for individuals being a member of an organization by 1.9 percentage points and the likelihhod of
investing in social capital by 3.96 percentage points. However, our results also indicate that the
reduction in the investment of social capital at the extensive margin (number of volunteers) is
compensated by an increase at the intensive margin (so that total hours volunteered if not affected
by immigration). Furthermore, using a supply push instrumental variable, standard in the migration
literature, allow us to argue that this relationship is causal.
16
Furthermore, we examined several mechanisms through which migration may affect social capital:
(i) reduction in income, (ii) increase in income inequality, (iii) increase in racial fractionalization,
(iv) lower propensity to invest in social capital by immigrants; and (v) reduction in average social
capital in the receiving community. By exclusion we argue that the most likely explanation is the
reduction in average social capital in receiving communities, consistent with Glaeser et al. (2002)
model but at odds with the empirical evidence they provide.
Our research has important implications for public policy, in particular, in the current round of
migration reform in the US. Currently foreigners can migrate through two distinct paths: (i) through
family reunification scheme, or (ii) through request by company for high skilled individuals. But
these paths are exclusive. Skill is not taken into consideration in the family reunification scheme
and family relation with residents in the US is not taken into consideration in the the second path.
What this study finds is that social capital (and therefore, relationship with individuals in the US)
matters and should be taken into consideration in all the migration paths as way to reduce the
economic impact of immigration in the receiving communities. A better scheme would be a point
scheme, like the ones used in Canada and Australia, which attributes points to different attributes of
immigrants, such as family relationship with residents in the destination and skill. Future research
should focus on the optimal number of points to give for different skill levels and relationship with
individuals residents at the destination (as the points given to each of these categories are different
across countries).
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Figure 1: Negative correlation between the fraction of white individuals who are members of an
organization for which they volunteer and the fraction of white foreign-born individuals across US
states and Washington, DC between 2005 and 2011.
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6 Appendix 2 - Tables
Obs Mean Stand Dev
Social Capital
Membership of institutions 362151 3.55% 0.231
Volunteering 362151 3.01% 0.171
Hours Volunteered 10030 2.105 15.5
Individual Characteristics
Full Time Workers 362151 61.02% 0.4877
Hourly Income 25610 11.18 6.17
Immigrants 362151 15.68% 0.364
Women 362151 49.40% 0.49996
Married 362151 50.66% 0.5
Children 362151 30.20% 0.459
Age 362151 39.97 14.21
Education
Graduated High School 362151 33.22% 0.471
Some College 362151 19.04% 0.393
College Degree or More 362151 30.63% 0.461
Race
White 362151 68.42% 0.465
Hispanic 362151 12.58% 0.332
African 362151 10.70% 0.309
Asian 362151 4.67% 0.211
Other 362151 3.63% 0.187
Household Characteristics
Household Income 252602 107.95 347.09
Household Size 252602 1.631 0.803
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State Characteristics
America Born 357 2969513 2861027
Foreign Born 357 542744 1107366
New Immigrants 357 10753 65201
Gini 357 0.266 0.034
Racial Fractionalization 357 0.383 0.161
MSA Characteristics
America Born 1099 599829 1053119
Foreign Born 1099 145304 485848
New Immigrants 1099 2854 38103
Gini 1044 0.199 0.098
Racial Fractionalization 1099 0.377 0.177
Table 1: Basic statistics for individual between the ages of
16 and 65 in the CPS September Sample between 2004 and
2011. For hours volunteered we restrict our sample to peo-
ple who had reported volunteering in the last year. Infor-
mation on mean hourly wages is conditional on reporting a
positive amount. We have several missing values for hourly
income because the September CPS sample is not as thor-
ough at collecting information about wages as the March
Sample. Household characteristics, state characteristics and
metropolitan area characteristics were calculated using the
same sample. Household income is total income per week.
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Obs Mean Stand Dev
Individual Characteristics
Full Time Workers 10030 63.13% 0.4825
Hourly Income 759 13.01 6.72
Immigrants 10030 10.62% 0.308
Women 10030 63.26% 0.482
Married 10030 63.57% 0.481
Children 10030 61.78% 0.486
Age 10030 39.24 11.78
Education
Graduated High School 10030 25.51% 0.436
Some College 10030 20.42% 0.403
College Degree or More 10030 44.29% 0.497
Race
White 10030 73.57% 0.441
Hispanic 10030 9.78% 0.297
African 10030 9.50% 0.293
Asian 10030 3.09% 0.173
Other 10030 4.06% 0.197
Household Characteristics
Household Income 9688 145.47 411.72
Household Size 9688 1.626 0.766
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Table 2: Basic statistics for individual between the ages
of 16 and 65 in the CPS September Sample between 2005
and 2011, who reported volunteering. Information on mean
hourly wages is conditional on reporting a positive amount.
We have several missing values for hourly income because the
September CPS sample is not as thorough at collecting infor-
mation about wages as the March Sample. Household charac-
teristics were calculated out of the same sample. Household
income is total income per week.
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Obs Mean Stand Dev
Social Capital
Membership of institutions 56790 2.34% 0.175
Volunteering 56790 1.88% 0.136
Hours Volunteered 1065 1.787 8.13
Individual Characteristics
Full Time Workers 56790 63.43% 0.4816
Hourly Income 4155 10.22 5.69
Women 56790 50.42% 0.49999
Married 56790 63.04% 0.483
Children 56790 42.79% 0.495
Age 56790 39.54 12.67
Education
Graduated High School 56790 26.31% 0.44
Some College 56790 11.92% 0.324
College Degree or More 56790 31.08% 0.463
Race
White 56790 21.06% 0.408
Hispanic 56790 45.29% 0.498
African 56790 8.04% 0.272
Asian 56790 22.50% 0.418
Other 56790 3.11% 0.174
Household Characteristics
Household Income 36075 116.05 372.29
Household Size 36075 1.958 0.974
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Table 3: Basic statistics for individual between the ages of 16
and 65 in the CPS September Sample between 2005 and 2011,
who are foreign born. Information on mean hourly wages is
conditional on reporting a positive amount. We have several
missing values for hourly income because the September CPS
sample is not as thorough at collecting information about
wages as the March Sample. Household characteristics were
calculated out of the same sample. Household income is total
income per week.
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OLS regression of Social Capital on Migration across Metropolitan Areas
Institution Membership Volunteers Volunteer Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total number of -0.024 -0.0086 0.0077 0.00006 -0.4203+ -0.101+
foreign born people (0.024) (0.0057) (0.026) (0.0057) (0.229) (0.055)
Number of own 0.01015* 0.0074 -0.018
race foreign born people (0.0041) (0.00504) (0.074)
Lagged number of 0.016 -0.00082 0.013* -0.00064 0.024 0.0034
american born people (0.0099) (0.0022) (0.0064) (0.0015) (0.069) (0.016)
Lagged number of -0.038* -0.0069+ 0.0069 -0.0015 -0.906** -0.182**
foreign born people (0.017) (0.0038) (0.023) (0.0041) (0.297) (0.06002)
Lagged number of own 0.0206** 0.016** 0.026**
race american born people (0.00083) (0.00062) (0.0037)
Lagged previous own race -0.0029 0.014** 0.0099+
foreign born people (0.0087) (0.0029) (0.00598)
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1099 3851 1099 3851 1099 3851
Number of Metropolitan Area 157 157 157 157 157 157
R-squared 0.08 0.73 0.02 0.76 0.12 0.07
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Table 4: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant
at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The data for
U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas was compiled using the
CPS September Sample between 2005 and 2011. Columns 1
and 2, look at the stock of social capital as measured by or-
ganization membership (as previous work by Glaeser et al.
(2002)), while for the remaining columns we look at the
investment of social capital measured by volunteering and
hours volunteered. In columns 2, 4 and 6, the total number
of foreign born people (row 1) excludes the number of own
race foreign born people (row 2). Therefore, for columns 3
to 6, row 1 and row 2 correspond to the change in the total
number of foreign born people and the change in the number
of own race foreign born people, respectively. While an in-
crease in total number of immigrants leads to a reduction in
social capital regardless of the definition used, an increase in
own race number of immigrants leads to an increase in social
capital.
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OLS regression of Social Capital on Migration across States
Institution Membership Volunteers Volunteer Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5) (6)
Total number of -0.079** -0.015** -0.017 -0.0035 -0.321 -0.017 -0.281**
foreign born people (0.025) (0.0048) (0.021) (0.0055) (0.367) (0.073) (0.099)
Number of own -0.017 -0.0032 -0.249* 0.00299
race foreign born people (0.014) (0.0093) (0.104) (0.071)
Lagged number of 0.024 -0.0046 0.036* 0.0036 -0.443+ -0.229** -0.107*
American born people (0.024) (0.0052) (0.016) (0.0032) (0.253) (0.0503) (0.048)
Lagged number of -0.0008 0.0005 0.0071 -0.0023 -1.121** -0.09521+ -0.219**
foreign born people (0.025) (0.0047) (0.0102) (0.0019) (0.251) (0.051 (0.054)
Lagged number of own 0.022 0.017** 0.02831** 0.0301**
race American born people (0.015) (0.00063) -0.00738 (0.0058)
Lagged previous own race 0.022** 0.019** 0.03407** 0.029**
foreign born people (0.00073) (0.0013) -0.00497 (0.0104)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 357 1778 357 1778 357 1778 1774
Number of State 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.3 0.88 0.09 0.90 0.24 0.16 0.14
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Table 5: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + signifi-
cant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The
data for the 50 U.S. States and Washington, D.C. was com-
piled using the CPS September sample between 2005 and
2011. Columns 1 and 2, look at the stock of social capital
as measured by organization membership (as previous work
by Glaeser et al. (2002)), while for the remaining columns
we look at the investment of social capital measured by vol-
unteering and hours volunteered. In columns 2, 4 and 6,
the total number of foreign born people (row 1) excludes the
number of own race foreign born people (row 2). Therefore,
for columns 3 to 6, row 1 and row 2 correspond to the change
in the total number of foreign born people and the change
in the number of own race foreign born people, respectively.
Regardless of the definition of social capital we use, the above
regressions show that an increase in immigration leads to a
reduction in social capital.
31
First Stage of IV regression of Social Capital on Migration across States
Change in total number of Change in number of own
Foreign Born People Race Foreign Born People
(1) (2) (3)
SPIV for 1.0199** 0.968** 0.064*
number of immigrants (0.142) (0.059) (0.0305)
SPIV for own 0.065 0.958**
Race number of immigrants (0.098) (0.051)
Lagged number of 0.074* -0.228** -0.045**
American born people (0.031) (0.0199) (0.0103)
Lagged number of -0.276** 0.059** 0.018**
foreign born people (0.052) (0.012) (0.0061)
Lagged number of own 0.0083 -0.015**
race American born people (0.0059) (0.00304)
Lagged previous own race -0.00072 0.00069
foreign born people (0.0015) (0.00078)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes Yes
Observations 357 1778 1778
Number of State 51 51 51
R-squared 0.38 0.33 0.23
F-test 51.57 136.57 179.37
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Table 6: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant
at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The data for
the 50 U.S. States and Washington, D.C. was compiled us-
ing the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. For
column 2 the independent variable in that regression (change
in the change in the number of foreign born people) excludes
the change in the number of own race foreign born people (in-
dependent variable in column 3). The Supply-Push Instru-
mental Variables (SPIV) uses information on the settlement
pattern of immigrants from the 2000 Census and the total
immigration into the US reported in the CPS from 2005 to
2011. The Supply-Push Instrumental Variable for Number of
Immigrants (row 1) in columns 2 and 3 exclude the Supply-
Push Instrumental Variable for Own Race Number of Immi-
grants (row 2). Both instruments have the correct sign and
are statistically significant.
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OLS regression of Social Capital on Migration across States
Volunteers Volunteer Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in total number of -0.121** -0.012 -0.859 -0.1795
foreign born people (0.047) (0.0098) (0.676) (0.154)
Change in number of own -0.088** -0.177
race foreign born people (0.017) (0.2595)
Lagged number of 0.041** 0.0048* -0.416** -0.284**
American born people (0.0105) (0.0019) (0.151) (0.077)
Lagged number of -0.042 -0.014** -1.377** -0.089**
Foreign born people (0.027) (0.0049) (0.386) (0.0304)
Lagged number of own 0.017** 0.026+
race American born people (0.00024) (0.014)
Lagged previous own race 0.0195** 0.034**
foreign born people (0.00087) (0.0038)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 357 1778 357 1778
Number of State 51 51 51 51
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Table 7: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant
at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The data
for the 50 U.S. States and Washington, D.C. was compiled
using the CPS September Sample between 2005 and 2011.
For columns 2 and 4, the change in the number of foreign
born people (row 1) excludes the change in the number of
own race foreign born people (row 2). As expected once we
control for reverse causality we find that the coefficients are
larger (in absolute terms) and statistically significant.
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OLS regression of individual Social Capital Measures on Migration
Dummy for being a member of an institution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total number of -0.0041 0.0017 0.0028 0.003002
Foreign Born People (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Lagged number of 0.0101** 0.0101** 0.0105** 0.0104**
Foreign Born People (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Lagged number of 0.0069+ -0.00016 0.0016 0.0014
America born people (0.0037) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0055)
Total number of own Race -0.019* -0.018* -0.018*
Foreign Born People (0.0083) (0.00803) (0.0081)
Lagged number of own 0.00051 0.00046 0.00046
Race America Born People (0.00035) (0.00033) (0.00033)
Lagged previous own Race 0.024* 0.023* 0.023*
Foreign Born People (0.0093) (0.0097) (0.0097)
Log Hourly Income 0.0071+ 0.0071+ 0.0071+
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Dummy for 0.016+ 0.017+ 0.017+
Missing Income (0.0088) (0.0097) (0.0097)
Household Income 0.00000701** 0.0000087** 0.0000087**
(0.0000023) (0.0000021) (0.0000021)
Household Income -0.000000001 -0.0000000015+ -0.0000000015+
Square (0.0000000009) (0.0000000008) (0.0000000008)
Dummy for being -0.014** -0.014** -0.014**
an immigrant (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Dummy for Full Time -0.0049** -0.0048** -0.0048**
Worker (0.00094) (0.00095) (0.00095)
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Dummy for women 0.015** 0.015** 0.015**
(0.00099) (0.00103) (0.00103)
Dummy for being -0.0036** -0.00301* -0.00301*
25 to 29 years old (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Dummy for being -0.0089** -0.0091** -0.0091**
30 to 34 years old (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Dummy for being -0.0068** -0.0073** -0.0073**
35 to 39 years old (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Dummy for being -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017
40 to 44 years old (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Dummy for being -0.000797 -0.00039 -0.00039
45 to 49 years old (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Dummy for being -0.0011 -0.00021 -0.00021
50 to 54 years old (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Dummy for being -0.0058** -0.0056** -0.0056**
55 to 59 years old (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Dummy for being -0.0063** -0.0062** -0.0062**
60 years old or older (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Household Size -0.012** -0.012** -0.012**
(0.000702) (0.00073) (0.00073)
Dummy for being 0.0046** 0.0049** 0.0049**
married (0.00089) (0.00097) (0.00097)
Dummy for having Children -0.0029+ -0.0026 -0.0026
0-2 years of old (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Dummy for having Children 0.021** 0.0197** 0.0197**
3-5 years of old (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Dummy for having Children 0.062** 0.062** 0.062**
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6-13 years of old (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Dummy for having Children 0.021** 0.021** 0.021**
14-17 years of old (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Dummy for being a High 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013
School Graduate (0.00084) (0.00092) (0.00092)
Dummy for having some 0.012** 0.012** 0.012**
College (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Dummy for having a 0.025** 0.025** 0.025**
College Degree or more (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Gini Coefficient -0.0025
for the State (0.027)
Racial fractionalization -0.0063
for the state (0.032)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 362154 362151 411874 362151 362151
Number of State 51 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03
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Table 8: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant
at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The sam-
ple includes individuals between the age of 16 and 65 years
old which are part of CPS September Sample between 2005
and 2011. Columns 1 and 2 show reduced form relationship
between membership in clubs and migration. All population
variables (American born and foreign born) are in millions
In column 3 we use a specification similar to Glaeser et al.
(2002), and add state level immigration variables in columns
4 and 5. The results show only an increase in own race foreign
born leads to a reduction in organization membership.
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OLS regression of individual Social Capital Measures on Migration
Dummy for volunteering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in total number of -0.0038 -0.0016 -0.00072 -0.0011
Foreign Born People (0.0033) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044)
Lagged number of 0.0062** 0.0062** 0.0065** 0.0064**
Foreign Born People (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Lagged number of 0.00018 -0.00063 0.0016 0.0016
America born people (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Change in number of own -0.0091 -0.0086 -0.0083
Race Foreign Born People (0.0057) (0.00601) (0.00602)
Lagged number of own 0.00052* 0.00046* 0.00046*
Race America Born People (0.00024) (0.00023) (0.00022)
Lagged previous own Race 0.0022** 0.0019** 0.0019**
Foreign Born People (0.00053) (0.00043) (0.00043)
Log Hourly Income 0.0037 0.0038 0.0038
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Dummy for 0.01005 0.0101 0.0101
Missing Income (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068)
Household Income 0.0000095** 0.0000096** 0.0000096**
(0.0000016) (0.0000016) (0.0000016)
Household Income -0.0000000026** -0.0000000026** -0.0000000026**
Square (0.0000000006) (0.0000000006) (0.0000000006)
Dummy for being -0.012** -0.012** -0.012**
an immigrant (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Dummy for Full Time -0.0041** -0.0041** -0.0041**
Worker (0.00069) (0.00069) (0.00069)
40
Dummy for women 0.012** 0.012** 0.012**
(0.00074) (0.00074) (0.00074)
Dummy for being -0.0016+ -0.0015+ -0.0016+
25 to 29 years old (0.00092) (0.00092) (0.00092)
Dummy for being -0.00502** -0.00502** -0.00503**
30 to 34 years old (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Dummy for being -0.0035** -0.0035** -0.0035**
35 to 39 years old (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Dummy for being 0.000032 0.000028 0.000022
40 to 44 years old (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Dummy for being 0.0011 0.00104 0.00103
45 to 49 years old (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Dummy for being 0.00042 0.00039 0.00039
50 to 54 years old (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102)
Dummy for being -0.0048** -0.0048** -0.0049**
55 to 59 years old (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Dummy for being -0.0057** -0.0057** -0.0057**
60 years old or older (0.00085) (0.00084) (0.00085)
Household Size -0.0087** -0.0087** -0.0087**
(0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00047)
Dummy for being 0.0026** 0.0026** 0.0026**
married (0.00063) (0.00063) (0.00063)
Dummy for having Children -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018
0-2 years of old (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Dummy for having Children 0.017** 0.017** 0.017**
3-5 years of old (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Dummy for having Children 0.0502** 0.0502** 0.0502**
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6-13 years of old (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Dummy for having Children 0.015** 0.015** 0.015**
14-17 years of old (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Dummy for being a High 0.00092 0.00091 0.00091
School Graduate (0.000795) (0.00079) (0.00079)
Dummy for having some 0.00901** 0.00903** 0.00903**
College (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Dummy for having a 0.018** 0.018** 0.018**
College Degree or more (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Gini Coefficient -0.0198
for the State (0.017)
Racial Fractionation 0.0028
for the State (0.021)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 294589 294589 294589 294589 294589
Number of State 51 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03
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Table 9: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant
at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The sam-
ple includes individuals between the age of 16 and 65 years
old which are part of CPS September Sample between 2005
and 2011. Columns 1 and 2 show reduced form relationship
between volunteering and immigration. Change in total num-
ber of foreign born in columns 2 to 5 excludes change in the
number of own race foreign born. All population variables
(American born and foreign born) are in millions. In column
3 we use a specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002), and
further add state level immigration variables in columns 4
and 5. The results show that only an increase in own race
foreign born leads to a (statistically insignificant) reduction
in volunteering.
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OLS regression of individual Social Capital Measures on Migration
Dummy for volunteering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in total number of 0.0305 0.112* 0.113* 0.107*
Foreign Born People (0.031) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041)
Lagged number of -0.0046 -0.0053 -0.0062 -0.011
America born people (0.0395) (0.041) (0.042) (0.0397)
Lagged number of -0.032 -0.0452+ -0.0395 -0.0398
Foreign Born People (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Change in number of own -0.197** -0.191** -0.182**
Race Foreign Born People (0.059) (0.058) (0.058)
Lagged number of own Race -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0016
America born people (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038)
Lagged previous own Race 0.011+ 0.01004+ 0.0099
Foreign Born People (0.0057) (0.00597) (0.006002)
Log Hourly Income 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Dummy for 0.034 0.034 0.033
Missing Income (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Household Income 0.0000089 0.0000087 0.0000092
(0.000023) (0.000023) (0.000023)
Household Income -0.0000000038 -0.0000000037 -0.0000000037
Square (0.0000000089) (0.0000000089) (0.0000000089)
Dummy for being -0.036** -0.035** -0.035**
an immigrant (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Dummy for Full Time -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017
Worker (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091)
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Dummy for women 0.032** 0.032** 0.032**
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096)
Dummy for being -0.0199* -0.0197* -0.0199*
25 to 29 years old (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094)
Dummy for being -0.034** -0.034** -0.034**
30 to 34 years old (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Dummy for being -0.038** -0.038** -0.038**
35 to 39 years old (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Dummy for being -0.045** -0.044** -0.045**
40 to 44 years old (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Dummy for being 0.0036 0.0037 0.0034
45 to 49 years old (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Dummy for being 0.019 0.019 0.019
50 to 54 years old (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Dummy for being 0.0015 0.0015 0.0014
55 to 59 years old (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0296)
Dummy for being -0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0094
60 years old or older (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Household Size -0.026** -0.026** -0.026**
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Dummy for being 0.0064 0.0064 0.0064
married (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Dummy for having Children 0.016 0.015 0.015
0-2 years of old (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Dummy for having Children 0.00073 0.00066 0.000696
3-5 years of old (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Dummy for having Children 0.097** 0.097** 0.097**
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6-13 years of old (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Dummy for having Children 0.068** 0.068** 0.068**
14-17 years of old (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Dummy for being a High 0.019+ 0.019+ 0.019+
School Graduate (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Dummy for having some 0.046** 0.046** 0.046**
College (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Dummy for having a 0.063** 0.063** 0.063**
College Degree or more (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092)
Gini Coefficient -0.665*
for the State (0.324)
Racial Fractionation -0.118
for the State (0.297)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 362151 362151 362151 362151 362151
Number of State 51 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 10: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + signifi-
cant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The
sample includes individuals between the age of 16 and 65
years old which are part of CPS September Sample between
2005 and 2011. Columns 1 and 2 show reduced form rela-
tionship between volunteer hours and immigration. Change
in total number of foreign born in columns 2 to 5 excludes
change in the number of own race foreign born. All pop-
ulation variables (American born and foreign born) are in
millions In column 3 we use a specification similar to Glaeser
et al. (2002), and further add state level immigration vari-
ables in columns 4 and 5. The results show that only an
increase in own race foreign born leads to a statistically sig-
nificant reduction in volunteer hours.
47
IV First Stage Regression of Social Capital on Migration
Change in total number of Foreign Born People
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPIV for total 1.139** 1.012** 1.012** 1.001**
number of Foreign Born People (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035)
SPIV for number 0.019** 0.019** 0.015**
of own race Foreign Born People (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051)
Lagged number of 0.0068** 0.0066** 0.0066** 0.00905**
America born people (0.00094) (0.00081) (0.00081) (0.0008002)
Lagged number of -0.158** -0.139** -0.139** -0.133**
Foreign Born People (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Lagged number of own -0.0019** -0.0019** -0.0019**
Race America Born People (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00011)
Lagged previous own Race 0.019** 0.019** 0.019**
Foreign Born People (0.00035) (0.00035) (0.00035)
Log Hourly Income 0.000997 0.0013
(0.00095) (0.00093)
Dummy for 0.0027 0.0033
Missing Income (0.0023) (0.0022)
Household Income 0.0000014* 0.0000016*
(0.00000069) (0.00000068)
Household Income -0.0000000004 -0.0000000005+
Square (0.0000000003) (0.0000000003)
Dummy for being 0.0021** 0.0021**
an immigrant (0.00037) (0.00037)
Dummy for Full Time -0.0000902 -0.00012
Worker (0.00024) (0.00024)
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Dummy for women -0.00014 -0.000077
(0.00022) (0.00021)
Dummy for being -0.00035 -0.00041
25 to 29 years old (0.00044) (0.00043)
Dummy for being -0.00036 -0.00039
30 to 34 years old (0.00045) (0.00044)
Dummy for being -0.00069 -0.00065
35 to 39 years old (0.00047) (0.00046)
Dummy for being -0.00037 -0.00036
40 to 44 years old (0.00047) (0.00046)
Dummy for being -0.00054 -0.00043
45 to 49 years old (0.00046) (0.00045)
Dummy for being -0.00012 -0.00014
50 to 54 years old (0.00044) (0.00043)
Dummy for being 0.00033 0.000305
55 to 59 years old (0.00043) (0.00042)
Dummy for being 0.00029 0.000101
60 years old or older (0.00043) (0.00043)
Household Size 0.00027* 0.00026*
(0.00011) (0.00011)
Dummy for being -0.00035 -0.00038
married (0.00025) (0.00024)
Dummy for having Children 0.00061 0.000702+
0-2 years of old (0.00041) (0.000401)
Dummy for having Children -0.00067 -0.00076+
3-5 years of old (0.00041) (0.00041)
Dummy for having Children -0.000045 -0.00011
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6-13 years of old (0.00033) (0.00033)
Dummy for having Children 0.00013 0.000103
14-17 years of old (0.00039) (0.00039)
Dummy for being a High 0.00046 0.00049
School Graduate (0.00034) (0.00033)
Dummy for having some 0.00024 0.00033
College (0.00038) (0.00037)
Dummy for having a 0.00052 0.00049
College Degree or more (0.00036) (0.00036)
Gini Coefficient -0.173**
for the State (0.0052)
Racial Fractionation 0.761**
for the State (0.0071)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 362151 362151 362151 362151
Number of State 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.47 0.38 0.38 0.40
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Table 11: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + sig-
nificant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
The sample includes individuals between the age of 16 and
65 years old which are part of CPS September Sample be-
tween 2005 and 2011. The independent variable in columns
2 through 4 excludes the change in the number of own race
foreign born. The Supply-Push Instrumental Variable is con-
structed at the state level and uses information on the set-
tlement pattern of immigrants from the 2000 Census and the
total immigration into the U.S. reported in the CPS from
2005 to 2011. The Supply-Push Instrumental Variable for
number of immigrants (row 1) in columns 2 and 3 exclude
the Supply-Push Instrumental Variable for own race number
of immigrants (row 2). All population variables (American
born and foreign born) are in millions. In column 3 we use
a specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002), and add state
level immigration variables in columns 4 and 5.The instru-
ments have the correct signs and are statistically significant.
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IV First Stage Regression of Social Capital on Migration
Change in number own Race Foreign Born People
(1) (2) (3)
SPIV for total 0.313** 0.313** 0.313**
number of Foreign Born People (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
SPIV for number 0.832** 0.831** 0.831**
of own race Foreign Born People (0.00299) (0.00299) (0.00299)
Lagged number of 0.0035** 0.0035** 0.0037**
America born people (0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00047)
Lagged number of -0.025** -0.025** -0.025**
Foreign Born People (0.00078) (0.00078) (0.00078)
Lagged number of own 0.00064** 0.00064** 0.00063**
Race America Born People (0.000067) (0.000067) (0.000067)
Lagged previous own Race -0.0095** -0.0095** -0.0095**
Foreign Born People (0.000204) (0.000204) (0.000204)
Log Hourly Income -0.000034 -0.000034
(0.00055) (0.00055)
Dummy for 0.000037 0.000033
Missing Income (0.0013) (0.0013)
Household Income 0.000000011 -0.000000015
(0.000000402) (0.000000402)
Household Income 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
Square (0.0000000002) (0.0000000002)
Dummy for being 0.00085** 0.00084**
an immigrant (0.00022) (0.00022)
Dummy for Full Time -0.00019 -0.00019
Worker (0.00014) (0.00014)
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Dummy for women 0.000046 0.000042
(0.00013) (0.00013)
Dummy for being 0.000304 0.00031
25 to 29 years old (0.00026) (0.00026)
Dummy for being 0.00024 0.00025
30 to 34 years old (0.00026) (0.00026)
Dummy for being 0.00049+ 0.000502+
35 to 39 years old (0.00027) (0.00027)
Dummy for being -0.000057 -0.000046
40 to 44 years old (0.00027) (0.00027)
Dummy for being -0.0000299 -0.000021
45 to 49 years old (0.00027) (0.00027)
Dummy for being 0.00029 0.000302
50 to 54 years old (0.00025) (0.00025)
Dummy for being 0.000295 0.000305
55 to 59 years old (0.00025) (0.00025)
Dummy for being 0.000036 0.000052
60 years old or older (0.00025) (0.00025)
Household Size 0.00017* 0.00017*
(0.000066) (0.000066)
Dummy for being -0.000099 -0.000098
married (0.00014) (0.00014)
Dummy for having Children 0.00014 0.00014
0-2 years of old (0.00024) (0.00024)
Dummy for having Children 0.000076 0.000076
3-5 years of old (0.00024) (0.00024)
Dummy for having Children 0.00048* 0.00048*
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6-13 years of old (0.00019) (0.00019)
Dummy for having Children -0.00019 -0.00019
14-17 years of old (0.00023) (0.00023)
Dummy for being a High -0.00037+ -0.00037+
School Graduate (0.000196) (0.000196)
Dummy for having some -0.00049* -0.00049*
College (0.00022) (0.00022)
Dummy for having a -0.00058** -0.00058**
College Degree or more (0.00021) (0.00021)
Gini Coefficient 0.039**
for the State (0.0031)
Racial Fractionation -0.012**
for the State (0.0042)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes Yes
Observations 362151 362151 362151
Number of State 51 51 51
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.35
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Table 12: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + signifi-
cant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The
sample includes individuals between the age of 16 and 65
years old which are part of CPS September Sample between
2005 and 2011. The Card Instruments is constructed at the
state level and uses information on the settlement pattern of
immigrants from the 2000 Census and the total immigration
into the U.S. reported in the CPS from 2005 to 2011. The
Supply-Push Instrumental Variable for number of immigrants
(row 1) in columns 2 and 3 exclude the Supply-Push Instru-
mental Variable for own race number of immigrants (row 2).
All population variables (American born and foreign born)
are in millions. In column 3 we use a specification similar to
Glaeser et al. (2002), and add state level immigration vari-
ables in columns 4 and 5. The instruments have the correct
signs and are statistically significant.
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IV regression of individual Social Capital Measures on Migration
Dummy for volunteering
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in total number of -0.013+ 0.0014 -0.00303 -0.0035
Foreign Born People (0.0071) (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0096)
Lagged number of 0.00605** 0.0059** 0.0062** 0.0061**
America born people (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Lagged number of -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0032 -0.0032
Foreign Born People (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Change in number of Foreign -0.0396* -0.035* -0.034*
Born People of own Race (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Lagged number of America 0.00049+ 0.00044 0.00044
Born people of own race (0.000296) (0.00029) (0.00029)
Lagged previous 0.0023** 0.00202* 0.00202*
Immigrants of own race (0.00083) (0.00082) (0.00082)
Log Hourly Income 0.0038 0.0038
(0.0024) (0.0024)
Dummy for 0.0102+ 0.0102+
Missing Income (0.0058) (0.0058)
Household Income 0.0000096** 0.0000096**
(0.0000018) (0.0000018)
Household Income -0.0000000026** -0.0000000026**
Square (0.0000000007) (0.0000000007)
Dummy for being -0.012** -0.012**
an immigrant (0.00095) (0.00095)
Dummy for Full Time -0.0041** -0.0041**
Worker (0.00062) (0.00062)
56
Dummy for women 0.012** 0.012**
(0.00055) (0.00055)
Dummy for being -0.0015 -0.0015
25 to 29 years old (0.0011) (0.0011)
Dummy for being -0.00501** -0.00502**
30 to 34 years old (0.0011) (0.0011)
Dummy for being -0.0034** -0.0034**
35 to 39 years old (0.0012) (0.0012)
Dummy for being 0.000029 0.000023
40 to 44 years old (0.0012) (0.0012)
Dummy for being 0.00103 0.00103
45 to 49 years old (0.0012) (0.0012)
Dummy for being 0.000401 0.000396
50 to 54 years old (0.0011) (0.0011)
Dummy for being -0.0048** -0.0048**
55 to 59 years old (0.0011) (0.0011)
Dummy for being -0.0057** -0.0057**
60 years old or older (0.0011) (0.0011)
Household Size -0.0087** -0.0087**
(0.00029) (0.00029)
Dummy for being 0.0026** 0.0026**
married (0.00063) (0.00063)
Dummy for having Children -0.0018+ -0.0018+
0-2 years of old (0.00103) (0.00103)
Dummy for having Children 0.017** 0.017**
3-5 years of old (0.00105) (0.00105)
Dummy for having Children 0.0502** 0.0502**
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6-13 years of old (0.00084) (0.00084)
Dummy for having Children 0.015** 0.015**
14-17 years of old (0.000999) (0.000999)
Dummy for being a High 0.00091 0.00091
School Graduate (0.00086) (0.00086)
Dummy for having some 0.00902** 0.00902**
College (0.00096) (0.00096)
Dummy for having a 0.018** 0.018**
College Degree or more (0.00092) (0.00092)
Gini Coefficient -0.019
for the State (0.014)
Racial Fractionation 0.0051
for the State (0.0199)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 362151 362151 362151 362151
Number of State 51 51 51 51
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Table 13: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + signifi-
cant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The
sample includes individuals between the age of 16 and 65
years old which are part of CPS September Sample between
2005 and 2011. For columns 2 to 4, the change in the num-
ber of foreign born people (row 1) excludes the change in the
number of own race foreign born people (row 2). All pop-
ulation variables (American born and foreign born) are in
millions. As expected once we control for reverse causality
we find that the coefficients are larger (in absolute terms) and
statistically significant.
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IV regression of individual Social Capital Measures on Migration
Dummy for volunteering
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in total number of -0.042 0.189 0.17999 0.166
Foreign Born People (0.119) (0.162) (0.162) (0.164)
Lagged number of -0.0061 -0.0066 -0.0075 -0.012
America born people (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Lagged number of -0.066 -0.055 -0.052 -0.053
Foreign Born People (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Change in number of own -0.4204 -0.407 -0.387
Race Foreign Born People (0.268) (0.268) (0.268)
Lagged number of own Race -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0017
America Born people (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00496)
Lagged previous own Race 0.012 0.011 0.011
Foreign Born People (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log Hourly Income 0.016 0.016
(0.041) (0.041)
Dummy for 0.034 0.033
Missing Income (0.098) (0.098)
Household Income 0.0000087 0.0000091
(0.0000298) (0.0000298)
Household Income -0.0000000037 -0.0000000037
Square (0.000000013) (0.000000013)
Dummy for being -0.035* -0.035*
an immigrant (0.016) (0.016)
Dummy for Full Time -0.0017 -0.0017
Worker (0.011) (0.011)
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Dummy for women 0.032** 0.032**
-0.009394369 -0.0093942873
Dummy for being (0.0196) 0.0198
25 to 29 years old -0.0189558289 (0.019)
Dummy for being -0.034+ -0.034+
30 to 34 years old (0.019) (0.019)
Dummy for being -0.038+ -0.038+
35 to 39 years old (0.0202) (0.0202)
Dummy for being -0.044* -0.045*
40 to 44 years old (0.0203) (0.0203)
Dummy for being 0.0037 0.0034
45 to 49 years old (0.0198) (0.0198)
Dummy for being 0.019 0.019
50 to 54 years old (0.019) (0.019)
Dummy for being 0.0016 0.0014
55 to 59 years old (0.018) (0.018)
Dummy for being -0.0092 -0.0094
60 years old or older (0.019) (0.019)
Household Size -0.026** -0.026**
(0.0049) (0.0049)
Dummy for being 0.0064 0.0064
married (0.011) (0.011)
Dummy for having Children 0.015 0.015
0-2 years of old (0.018) (0.018)
Dummy for having Children 0.00066 0.0007004
3-5 years of old (0.018) (0.018)
Dummy for having Children 0.097** 0.097**
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6-13 years of old (0.014) (0.014)
Dummy for having Children 0.068** 0.068**
14-17 years of old (0.017) (0.017)
Dummy for being a High 0.019 0.019
School Graduate (0.015) (0.015)
Dummy for having some 0.046** 0.046**
College (0.016) (0.016)
Dummy for having a 0.063** 0.063**
College Degree or more (0.016) (0.016)
Gini Coefficient -0.642**
for the State (0.231)
Racial Fractionation -0.163
for the State (0.337)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 362151 362151 362151 362151
Number of State 51 51 51 51
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Table 14: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + signifi-
cant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The
sample includes individuals between the age of 16 and 65
years old which are part of CPS September Sample between
2005 and 2011. For columns 2 to 4, the change in the num-
ber of foreign born people (row 1) excludes the change in the
number of own race foreign born people (row 2). All pop-
ulation variables (American born and foreign born) are in
millions. As expected once we control for reverse causality
we find that the coefficients are larger (in absolute terms) but
statistically insignificant.
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